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	<title>Ray Strode &#187; Fedora</title>
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	<link>http://blogs.gnome.org/halfline</link>
	<description>So...</description>
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		<title>Fedora 10</title>
		<link>http://blogs.gnome.org/halfline/2008/11/25/fedora-10/</link>
		<comments>http://blogs.gnome.org/halfline/2008/11/25/fedora-10/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 25 Nov 2008 19:57:22 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>halfline</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Fedora]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[General]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.gnome.org/halfline/?p=49</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[So, just a quick note to say Fedora 10 is out. 
If you haven&#8217;t tried Fedora in a while, and you&#8217;re curious give the live image a try on a USB stick.
]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>So, just a quick note to say <a href="http://docs.fedoraproject.org/release-notes/f10/en_US/">Fedora 10</a> is out. </p>
<p>If you haven&#8217;t tried Fedora in a while, and you&#8217;re curious give the <a href="http://download.fedoraproject.org/pub/fedora/linux/releases/10/Live/i686/F10-i686-Live.iso">live image</a> a try on a <a href="http://docs.fedoraproject.org/install-guide/f10/en_US/sn-making-media.html">USB stick</a>.</p>
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		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
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		<title>those dialogs</title>
		<link>http://blogs.gnome.org/halfline/2007/10/10/those-dialogs/</link>
		<comments>http://blogs.gnome.org/halfline/2007/10/10/those-dialogs/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 10 Oct 2007 02:38:09 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>halfline</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Fedora]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[GNOME]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.gnome.org/halfline/2007/10/10/those-dialogs/</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[So there has been a lot of discussion recently about the key import dialog in PackageKit recently.  We were talking about it on the bus on the way to work this morning, in fact.  Here&#8217;s my thoughts (and some thoughts I didn&#8217;t come up with, but came from the bus discussion):

Showing the fingerprint [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>So there has been a lot of discussion recently about <a href="http://hughsient.livejournal.com/40208.html">the key import dialog in PackageKit</a> recently.  We were talking about it on the bus on the way to work this morning, in fact.  Here&#8217;s my thoughts (and some thoughts I didn&#8217;t come up with, but came from the bus discussion):</p>
<ul>
<li>Showing the fingerprint in the dialog is only useful if the fingerprint is somewhere else the user knows to look</li>
<li>You obviously can&#8217;t put where to look in the key itself, because the key isn&#8217;t trusted until the fingerprint is verified</li>
<li>Since you can&#8217;t put it in the  key, discoverability is a hard problem.  We pretty much have to hope that the key is in plain view on the website that offers the package / repo.</li>
<li>&#8220;trust&#8221; is a bit of a stretch in any case, because often users will google around for software and install whatever they find. It&#8217;s really more &#8220;verify the software comes from the website that originally pointed to the package / repo file.&#8221;</li>
<li>Only users who really understand the security implications of the dialog are going to verify that the key fingerprints  match</li>
<li>Given that most people who see the dialog aren&#8217;t going to verify that the key fingerprints match, the dialog isn&#8217;t useful for security (it only solves the identification problem for a small subset of users)</li>
<li> One way to make the dialog more secure would be to treat the fingerprint like a CD key / activation number that the user has to enter instead of something that gets shown to the user.   If entering the key was a required step for configuring a system to use a repository, then websites that offer repositories would have to include the fingerprint with the repo in plain view for the repo to be useful, and users couldn&#8217;t just click past the dialog without reading it.</li>
<li>Some might argue that users are accustomed to entering these types of numbers already when installing software.  There&#8217;s precedent anyway.</li>
<li>Having to enter long strings of numbers sucks (just as much as having to read long strings of numbers sucks)</li>
<li>Either way, there&#8217;s a very real aesthetic problem with this type of dialog, and it&#8217;s not clear there&#8217;s an easy way to fix that</li>
<li>One thing that can help is have the distribution know about a select number of 3rd party repos/keys out of the box, so then the dialog can hide the key fingerprint entirely.</li>
<li>Figuring out which keys to ship within a distribution is an interesting problem itself, but maybe it should have some parallels to the processes that the distribution uses for adding packages?</li>
</ul>
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		<slash:comments>6</slash:comments>
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